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In recent years, Ideomotor Theory has regained widespread attention and sparked the
development of a number of theories on goal-directed behavior and learning. However,
there are two issues with previous studies’ use of Ideomotor Theory. Although Ideomotor
Theory is seen as very general, it is often studied in settings that are considerably more
simplistic than most natural situations. Moreover, Ideomotor Theory’s claim that effect
anticipations directly trigger actions and that action-effect learning is based on the forma-
tion of direct action-effect associations is hard to address empirically. We address these
points from a computational perspective. A simple computational model of IdeomotorThe-
ory was tested in tasks with different degrees of complexity.The model evaluation showed
that Ideomotor Theory is a computationally feasible approach for understanding efficient
action-effect learning for goal-directed behavior if the following preconditions are met: (1)
The range of potential actions and effects has to be restricted. (2) Effects have to follow
actions within a short time window. (3) Actions have to be simple and may not require
sequencing. The first two preconditions also limit human performance and thus support
Ideomotor Theory. The last precondition can be circumvented by extending the model
with more complex, indirect action generation processes. In conclusion, we suggest that
IdeomotorTheory offers a comprehensive framework to understand action-effect learning.
However, we also suggest that additional processes may mediate the conversion of effect
anticipations into actions in many situations.
Keywords: ideomotor theory, associative learning, computational model, planning, consolidation
INTRODUCTION
Human beings are continuously confronted with change and nov-
elty. Novel tools emerge, the environment changes, the social role
of an individual changes, and the body grows and ages. Human
beings can only deal with change and novelty because they can
learn. Ideomotor Theory proposes a mechanism for learning to
reach ones goals in novel situations. Ideomotor Theory is simple,
old, elegant, and thus highly attractive (Herbart, 1825; Laycock,
1845; James, 1890; for a review of its history see Stock and Stock,
2004). It is a core element of many contemporary theories of goal-
directed action (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Hoffmann, 2003) and
has found considerable empirical support (e.g., Elsner and Hom-
mel, 2001; Kunde et al., 2004, for a review see Shin et al., 2010).
Its principles have also been picked up in other domains, such as
social cognition (Paulus, 2012).
What follows is a brief summary of Ideomotor Theory. When-
ever a movement is executed, the (mental representation of the)
movement gets associated with (the mental representation of) its
effects. This association between movement and effect is bidirec-
tional. If the organism later wants to reach a goal state, the mere
anticipation of this state may be sufficient to directly trigger the
appropriate movement. This simple principle has been elaborated
in more detailed theories of goal-directed action. For example,
the theory of anticipatory behavior has put additional empha-
sis on the situation dependency of action-effect relationships
(Hoffmann, 1993, 2003; Stock and Hoffmann, 2002). The The-
ory of Event Coding provides a sophisticated representational
structure (Hommel et al., 2001).
Ideomotor Theory and many of its successors share three core
assumptions. First, to trigger an action, the effects of the action are
anticipated (effect anticipation). Second, this anticipatory image
of action-effects directly activates an action by means of direct
associations between actions and effects (direct-activation). Third,
during learning these associations are acquired more or less inde-
pendently of the actor’s current intentions and possibly without
the help of a teacher (associative learning rule). This formulation
of Ideomotor Theory, especially the direct-activation claim, dis-
tinguishes it from other approaches and can be called the “strong”
Ideomotor Theory (Shin et al., 2010).
The effect anticipation assumption is supported by a range
of experiments. A common feature of these experiments is that
they show that the selection, initiation, and control of an action
is affected by the features of its effects. An example is an experi-
ment in which the response-effect-compatibility was manipulated
(Kunde, 2001). In each trial, participants were asked to press one
of four horizontally arranged keys in response to a non-spatial
color stimulus. Each key press was followed by an effect stimu-
lus in one of four horizontally arranged positions on a screen. If
the positions of the keys corresponded to the positions of their
effects, responses were faster than when there was no such spatial
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response-effect compatibility. Similar effects have been reported
for other kinds of actions and stimuli, including social behavior
(Kunde et al., 2004, 2011).
Likewise, the direct-activation claim has found empirical sup-
port. For example, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies
have shown that the mere perception of stimuli that were used
as action-effects in an acquisition phase activated motor areas
(Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008; Paulus et al., 2012). How-
ever, it remains unclear whether this activation results from direct
action-effect links, as suggested by Ideomotor Theory, or if the
link is mediated by other, potentially automatic, processes. It also
remains to be studied if such observations can be confirmed for
action-effect learning in more complex tasks.
Finally, it is hard to test the associative learning rule claim
empirically. Even though action-effect learning shares character-
istics with associative learning (Elsner and Hommel, 2004), it is
difficult to draw conclusions about the underlying learning mech-
anisms. To conclude, Ideomotor Theory offers an astonishingly
simple and elegant mechanism to explain the acquisition and
execution of goal-directed actions. However, although the the-
ory found empirical support, it is surprising that the assumed
mechanisms have barely been adopted in computational models
or machine learning algorithms.
From a psychological point of view, it is suspicious that Ideo-
motor Theory has rarely found a way into computational models
of human learning and goal-directed actions. For example, in the
domain of motor learning and control, only a few computational
models can be considered direct implementations of Ideomotor
Theory (e.g., Herbort et al., 2005). Most approaches differ consid-
erably (for reviews see Wolpert et al., 2001; Todorov, 2004; Butz
et al., 2008).
From a functional point of view, it can be argued that Ideo-
motor Theory has mostly been studied in rather simple settings.
In experiments the range of relevant actions and effects is con-
strained, the to be executed actions are usually simple, and the
effects quickly follow actions. While these features are shared by
some real-world learning tasks, many real-world situations have
less clearly identifiable action and effect dimensions, require the
execution of more complex actions, and provide delayed effects
only. Thus, even though recent experiments progressed toward
studying action-effect learning in more realistic settings (e.g.,
Paulus et al., 2012), it remains unclear to what extent Ideomotor
Theory is applicable to more complex learning tasks. Doubt of the
applicability of Ideomotor Theory in such situations is also raised
by the fact that many machine learning techniques and artificial
intelligence approaches have little in common with Ideomotor
Theory.
The previous considerations show that Ideomotor Theory is a
well-accepted framework. Nonetheless, there are reasons to ques-
tion whether the theory fully lives up to its claims. Here, we adopt
a computational perspective to put Ideomotor Theory to the test.
To this aim, we cast Ideomotor Theory in a simple computational
model that is based on the theories’ basic claims. We then eval-
uate the performance of the model in a series of tasks to test
if it reproduces empirical findings. Our goal is to test Ideomo-
tor Theory with our model, rather than developing a model that
strives to account all behavioral findings related to action-effect
learning. Each task aims to capture the essence of a real-world
challenge for any learning mechanism. During our exploration,
we take two different perspectives. The psychological perspective
considers whether Ideomotor Theory parallels human behavior,
in both success and failure. The functional perspective considers
which kinds of tasks can be mastered with Ideomotor Theory. This
includes the question of whether it can account theoretically for
learning to coordinate actions in tasks other than those previously
studied in the lab.
Evidently, the brain relies on other learning mechanisms besides
the one specified by Ideomotor Theory (Doya, 1999). Conse-
quently, the failure or success of our model in specific tasks could
be attributed to mechanisms other than the one proposed by Ideo-
motor Theory. Nevertheless, an isolated computational analysis of
Ideomotor Theory will shed additional light on its validity. First,
a computational analysis of various learning tasks allows us to test
whether Ideomotor Theory specifies a basic learning mechanism
that bootstraps the acquisition of goal-directed behavior. Second,
even though other learning mechanisms may complement Ideo-
motor Theory, it is important to know how far one can go with
Ideomotor Theory alone and under which conditions Ideomo-
tor Theory fails or requires complementary mechanisms. Finally,
a computational analysis of various learning tasks may help to
identify potential challenges for Ideomotor Theory.
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF STRONG IDEOMOTOR
THEORY
In this section, we outline a simple computational model which
strives to capture the core ideas of Ideomotor Theory without
adding unnecessary features. Figure 1A depicts the general layout
of the model. It is comprised of a simple, single-layered neural net-
work containing two sets of nodes: action nodes and effect nodes
(A1, A2, . . ., An, and E1, E2, . . ., En). For each action, there is one
action node and for each effect, there is one effect node. If an action
is executed or an effect is perceived, the respective nodes are active
(i.e., activity is set to 1.0). If no action is executed or no effect is
perceived, they are mute (activity is set to 0.0). The action-effect
association wij between an action node Ai and an effect node Ej is
strengthened when both nodes are active at the same time.
A model structure
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FIGURE 1 | (A) According to Ideomotor Theory, actions (A1,. . .) get
associated to their effects (E 1, . . .) when a person learns a novel task, such
as throwing a ball. (B) In the example, each action node activates a throw of
different strength and each effect node encodes the height of the resulting
ball flight. If A1 resulted in E 1 (gray circles), the link between both (w 11) is
strengthened.
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We apply this mechanism to a simple exemplar task: learning to
throw a ball to particular heights. Each action node is associated to
a throwing movement with a particular strength. In our example,
activating A1 causes a weak throw, activating A2 causes a somewhat
stronger throw, and so on. In this view, an action is defined as the
production of a throw with specific strength, and throws of dif-
ferent strengths are considered different actions. Each effect node
encodes a specific height. During learning, actions are randomly
and individually executed1. Thus, there is only one active action
node which gets associated to the activated effect nodes. In our
model, the weight of the association between two active nodes is
increased by one. To produce goal-directed behavior an effect node
is activated and the activity is spread to the action nodes. If the goal
is to produce the effect associated with the i-th effect node, each
action node Aj is activated by the value wji. To select an action node,
a winner-takes-all procedure is applied by selecting the action
node with the highest activation. If there are several nodes with
maximal activation, one of them is selected randomly. This for-
mulation is fairly simple, but it captures Ideomotor Theory’s three
main assumptions: effect anticipation, direct-activation, and the
associative learning rule.
MODEL FEATURES
Learning rule
Although we kept the model as simple and generic as possible, we
want to explain some design decisions before proceeding. First,
artificial neural networks are usually modeled with non-linear
nodes (e.g., node activations are restricted to a range from 0.0 to
1.0 by a non-linear, sigmoidal input function) or include mecha-
nisms to bind the associative strength between two nodes. Because
we select the action node with the highest activation in a winner-
takes-all mode, such algorithms would not affect the predictions
of our model in the tasks we employ.
Situation and context
Obviously, Ideomotor Theory as it is formulated above is an
oversimplification because it does not take into account that
actions may have different effects in different situations. The
model could be easily extended to encode action-effect associa-
tions situation-dependently. To keep our model simple, we do not
account for the situation from the beginning but will introduce
situation-dependencies later.
Representation
For the sake of the simplicity of our model, we consider only a sin-
gle action dimension and a single stimulus dimension. Of course, it
would be possible to integrate more than one stimulus dimension.
Indeed, it has been suggested that a population-code like repre-
sentational structure, as is employed in our model, is especially
suited to allow the integration of multiple stimulus dimension
(Ma et al., 2006). Moreover, in our model the representational
structure does not change. Each node consistently encodes the
same action or stimulus. Thus, the model does not implement any
mechanisms for changing the receptive field of the present nodes
1Actions are selected with equal probability and independent of action selections in
previous learning episodes.
or introducing new nodes. These simplifications are justified for
three reasons. First, our tasks can be learned without adaptations
of the representational structure. Second, adaptation is only possi-
ble once some skill is acquired in a given task. Because we also want
to test the claim that Ideomotor Theory can bootstrap learning, we
exclude such mechanisms. Third, no such processes are specified
by Ideomotor Theory and we aim to provide a proof of principle
of Ideomotor Theory. Nevertheless, future modeling might greatly
benefit from integrating Ideomotor Theory with a richer, adaptive
representational structure.
TASK
As a simple scenario for our model evaluation, we refer to the
example of a child that is about to learn to throw a ball to various
heights. In the example, actions are defined as throws of differ-
ent strengths. The child can also perceive the position of the ball
(Figure 1B). While we keep the task as simple as described here
in the first test case, it is subsequently enriched. The task will
be changed with respect to the action-effect mappings and the
dynamics of actions and effects. However, some aspects of the
task will stay constant. First, learning is always unsupervised. This
means that the model receives neither reinforcement signals (such
as “this action was good”) nor corrective feedback (such as “next
time better use action X”) from an external teacher or from internal
prior knowledge. This reflects the central claim of Ideomotor The-
ory that goal-directed actions can be acquired solely by observing
the effects of own movements. Second, the same associative learn-
ing rule will be applied in all settings. Third, the representational
structure will remain fairly constant, with the exception being that
the number of action and effect nodes will be varied.
EVALUATION
The model can be tested by selecting a goal state and activating the
associated effect node. The action then suggested by the model can
be read out as described above. If the action produces the desired
effect, it can be considered a success. To evaluate the performance
of the model in various tasks, we generate a number of inde-
pendent instances of the model and train them. At various time
points during training we require each instance of the model to
reach each possible goal state. If the model outcome is stochastic,
each goal is presented repeatedly. As a measure of performance, we
report the percentage of successful actions, averaged over all goals,
repetitions, and model instances. Later, we distinguish between
successful and optimal actions. Optimal actions are defined as
successful actions that produce the goal in the most efficient way.
When a model is tested, no novel action-effect associations are
formed.
ROADMAP
In the following, we present five different scenarios in which we
examine the performance of Ideomotor Theory in the face of dif-
ferent challenges imposed by many learning tasks. In Case 1, we
show that the model is able to learn to control a task defined by
a simple one-to-one mapping. Even if the number of actions or
effects increases or noise is added, the model remains effective.
In Case 2, we show that model performance degrades if multiple
and potentially irrelevant actions can be executed in parallel. This
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implies that Ideomotor Theory explains learning best in a task
in which actions and effects are clearly defined. In Case 3, we
show that the model is able to encode redundant action possi-
bilities, which is a central problem in motor learning. In Case 4,
we extend the model by allowing actions to trigger a chain of
effects at various time points. This case shows that learning in our
model depends critically on the close temporal proximity between
action and effect. Finally, in Case 5, we examine the scenario that
a sequence of actions is necessary to produce an effect. It is shown
that Ideomotor Theory has difficulties in learning longer action
sequences. It is suggested that this shortcoming can be overcome
by introducing additional mechanisms which, however, go beyond
some of the core assumptions of Ideomotor Theory.
MODEL EVALUATION
CASE 1: ONE-TO-ONE MAPPING BETWEEN ACTIONS AND EFFECTS
The simplest learning task is that of a one-to-one mapping between
actions and effects. In this case, each action produces one specific
effect and each effect is produced by one specific action. This
case closely describes many experiments on Ideomotor Theory in
which participants usually perform clearly defined actions (e.g.,
button presses) that are accompanied by clearly defined effects
(tones, e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2001). It seems obvious that
Ideomotor Theory can account for learning when only few differ-
ent actions and effects are involved. In many situations, however, a
much greater number of actions and effects are possible, and as a
result we tested our model with different numbers of actions and
effects (2, 10, 50, 250). Figure 2A shows the results of 100 simu-
lated runs for each number of actions and effects. If the number
of possible actions and effects is low (e.g., 2 or 10), the model of
Ideomotor Theory is able to produce different effects after very
few trials. This corresponds to the results of Wolfensteller and
Ruge (2011), who report action-effect learning after very few rep-
etitions of different possible action-effect episodes. However, if the
number of distinguishable actions and effects increases, learning
takes longer but still results in a high success rate. The main rea-
son that learning slows down with a growing number of actions is
that for maximal performance, each action has to be executed at
least once. In sum, Ideomotor Theory can successfully account for
goal-directed behavior in one-to-one scenarios.
As a first step toward more realistic situations we wanted to test
whether learning is robust to noise. To do this we ran the simula-
tion with four actions and effects and added noise during learning.
To compare the conditions, noise was switched off during testing.
In the no noise condition, we did not include noise. In one condi-
tion, we set the initial action-effect association weights to Gaussian
distributed random values (m= 0.0, sd = 1.0). In another con-
dition, we added random Gaussian noise to each node in each
learning episode (m= 0.0, sd = 1.0). This corresponds to a situa-
tion in which neither actions nor effects can be encoded noise-free
by the neural apparatus. In a third condition, the selected action
was replaced by one of the other actions in half of all learning
episodes. This corresponds to a clumsy child with a very noisy
motor system2. Finally, we combined all noise conditions. Each
2In many real-world tasks this kind of noise can be controlled to some extent, e.g.,
by moving slowly (Fitts, 1954). Our exemplar task is too simple to offer the ability
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FIGURE 2 | (A)The chart shows the percentage of successful actions after
various numbers of learning episodes for scenarios with different numbers
of possible actions and effects. (B)The chart shows the impact of various
kinds of noise on the performance of the model of Ideomotor Theory (using
four actions/effects).
condition was simulated 1000 times. Figure 2B shows that even
though noise slows down learning, the behavior is successful in
the end. Comparing the simulation data with empirical results
suggests that action-effect learning is subject to very little noise
in common experimental setups (Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011).
This seems reasonable, as actions and stimuli are usually easily
distinguishable in the lab.
To conclude, the model accounts for action-effect learning in a
simple task. If noise is low and the number of different actions and
effects corresponds to the number used in experimental setups, the
model requires about the same amount of training as humans do.
When the number of potential actions and effects is high or when
noise is present, learning is slower but still effective in the end.
CASE 2: ONE-TO-ONE MAPPING WITH IRRELEVANT ACTIONS
In the previous case, the child throwing the ball could only exe-
cute actions that were directly related to the task. However, while
throwing, the child could have reoriented the head and the eyes,
to model such strategic adjustments. However, it is conceivable that such strategic
adjustments can be integrated in our model by including information about motor
noise in effect representations.
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tapped with a foot, swayed the body, or could have talked. Thus,
besides actions that have an immediate impact on the effect, many
other actions can be executed in parallel. Consequently, the effects
of the novel task may get associated to other, irrelevant actions.
To test whether this poses a problem, we added 16 irrelevant
action nodes to the four relevant nodes in our model. The activa-
tion of irrelevant action nodes did not yield any effects (at least
in the effect nodes under consideration). Each of the irrelevant
action nodes was activated randomly with a fixed probability dur-
ing training. In addition, one actually relevant action node was
activated in every learning episode. Figure 3A shows that learning
slows down with increasing probability of irrelevant action nodes
being active. Thus, even a moderate ratio of relevant to irrelevant
actions could decrease the speed of learning by up to an order
of magnitude. Figure 3B also shows that the ratio of relevant
to irrelevant action nodes affects initial learning, even though a
high performance level is reached after some time. In the analysis,
irrelevant action nodes were activated with a probability of 0.25.
It seems reasonable to assume that in many situations and
tasks, the ratio of task-relevant actions to task-irrelevant actions
is much less favorable than assumed in our (noise-free) exam-
ples. Thus, on its own, Ideomotor Theory provides a rather slow
and ineffective learning mechanism. We see three ways to deal
with this limitation. First, it can be acknowledged that learning a
novel task without a teacher takes time. We discuss this issue in
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FIGURE 3 | (A)The chart shows the effect of the relative frequency of
activating irrelevant action nodes on ideomotor learning. (B)The chart
shows the effect of the ratio of relevant and irrelevant actions on ideomotor
learning.
more detail in the general discussion. Second, one could assume
that an attentional mechanism constrains the range of possibly
to-be-associated action and effect nodes. However, from a learn-
ing perspective, this assumption is problematic. It implies that
a more fundamental learning mechanism than that proposed by
Ideomotor Theory pre-structures the learning problem and that
Ideomotor Theory is insufficient for bootstraping learning. Third,
the sparse coding scheme results in a high number of different
action and effect representations. Nodes with broad receptive fields
might be employed to first home in on the relevant action and
stimulus dimensions of a task. The resulting constrained space of
task-relevant action-effect might then be subject to action-effect
learning as described in our model. Indeed, it has been shown that
executing actions primes stimulus dimensions that relate to this
action (Fagioli et al., 2007), and that infants turn attention toward
relevant stimulus dimensions when skills improve (Eppler, 1995).
However, even if more sophisticated representational structures
might facilitate learning in our model, it must be kept in mind that
most tasks are also much more complex than our exemplar one.
To conclude,Case 1 and Case 2 have shown that if the number of
relevant actions and effect nodes is high and task-irrelevant actions
can be executed during learning, the learning mechanism under-
lying Ideomotor Theory may be rather inefficient, even though it
leads to an effective action selection in the end.
CASE 3: REDUNDANT ACTION POSSIBILITIES
Up until now we have considered cases with one-to-one mappings
between actions and effects. However, most goals can be reached in
numerous ways. To accommodate this, the ball-throwing example
is modified. Consider that the child is now tossing a paper plane
and not a ball. To make the paper plane fly as far as possible, just the
right amount of force is needed. This means that some flying dis-
tances (effects) can be reached either with a strong or a mild throw.
To include this into our model we extended the range of actions.
For the milder throws (A1–A4), increasing throwing force result
in increasing flying distances (E1–E4). However, for the stronger
throws (A5–A7), increasing throwing force results in decreasing
flying distance (E3–E1). Humans face similarly structured situa-
tions all the time. For example, a specific hand position in 3D space
can be realized by an infinite number of arm postures. Likewise,
most objects can be grasped in different ways. Figure 4A shows
that two distinct action nodes get associated to each of the effects
E1–E3 during learning. For example, it is encoded that E1 can be
realized by either executing A1 or A7. Thus, Ideomotor Theory is
able to encode redundant action possibilities for each action.
This feature is not trivial, because many learning mechanisms
(e.g., direct inverse modeling) can barely cope with similar prob-
lems (Jordan and Wolpert, 1999). The reason for this is that they
cannot encode two or more distinct actions that result in the same
effect. If several actions produce the same effect, these actions are
blended into a single representation. Considering our example, a
short flying distance would be associated with a mixture of weak
and strong throws. Thus, a medium force throw would effectively
be activated when striving for short flying distances, even if it
effectively produces rather large flying distances. This problem is
also referred to as the non-convexity problem (Jordan and Wolpert,
1999).
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FIGURE 4 | (A–D)The left chart of each panel shows the action-effect (AE)
associations after 1000 episodes (darker squares indicate stronger
associations) with different Gaussian action turning functions (SD=0.0, 1.0,
2.0, 3.0). The right chart of each panel shows the exemplar tuning functions
for action 4. (E)The chart shows the effect of the action tuning function on the
performance of the model.
Even though Ideomotor Theory is not subject to the non-
convexity problem under ideal conditions, its performance may
degrade under more realistic circumstances. In the example of
Figure 1A, the action nodes were tuned very sharply to specific
actions, resulting in the activation of a single node. This precise
representation results in the likewise accurate representation of
the action-effect structure of the task. However, in neural systems,
nodes are frequently tuned much more broadly (Georgopoulos
et al., 1983; Bastian et al., 2003). To implement this finding, an
action is now encoded by all action nodes based on a Gaussian
tuning function, where the i-th action activates each node Aj based
on a Gaussian function with mean i3. Hence, when the i-th action
is executed, not only is action node Ai active, but adjacent nodes
are also active, albeit somewhat less so. To assess the effect of the
breadth of the tuning function, we set its standard deviation to
either 0, 1, 2, or 3. Figures 4A–D shows that the representation
of redundant actions degrades with broader tuning curves. As
a result, the model loses its ability to reproduce certain effects
(Figure 4E). To conclude, Ideomotor Theory can be applied to
3The activity of node Aj when executing the i-th action was defined as the integral of
the Gaussian probability density function with mean i between j − 0.5 and j+ 0.5.
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some extent to redundant tasks if the tuning functions of actions
nodes are sharp. Under more realistic conditions performance
partially degrades.
CASE 4: DYNAMIC ACTION-EFFECTS
In the previous cases, the potential delay between actions and
effects was not considered. However, timing is an important fac-
tor in action-effect learning (Elsner and Hommel, 2004; Haering
and Kiesel, 2012). Moreover, in the real word, effects are not only
delayed, but less clearly defined than in the lab. For example,
throwing a ball results in the ball passing through a number of
states on the way to the peak of the trajectory and then down again.
Likewise, the activation of muscles causes the body to transition
through a number of states.
To test whether Ideomotor Theory can explain learning in such
tasks, we made our scenario more dynamic. Upon the execution
of one of four actions, the ball moves up and down on a parabolic
path. The trajectory of the ball was modeled so that the strongest
throw propels the ball to the peak of its trajectory within 0.5 s.
The ball then falls down again for 0.5 s4. Depending on the rate
with which the child updates the position of the ball, each action
causes a number of successive effects. To be able to associate an
action to these effects, we include a trace conditioning mechanism
in the model (Pavlov, 1927). Each action node remains active after
action execution for a certain time interval. Thus, it can be associ-
ated to delayed action-effects. While such a mechanism seems to
be a prerequisite for learning, the learning task gets considerably
more difficult because the action-effect relation is less clear-cut
than in the previous cases.
As a first step, we explored the sampling rate with which the
effects are perceived. We used sampling rates of 2, 4, 10, and 100 Hz,
meaning that the effect nodes are updated every 500, 250, 100, or
10 ms, respectively. Additionally, we included a condition in which
the peak height of the ball was presented as a single effect. Under
all conditions with dynamic effects, it was more difficult to learn
to reproduce the different possible peak heights than under the
single effect condition (Figure 5A).
These results suggest that a mechanism to single out the rel-
evant event is crucial. In our example, this was difficult because
the model was perceptually unable to distinguish between a ball
on its way up, down, or at the peak of the trajectory. Indeed, from
the perspective of the model, actions were mostly successful. As
the model cannot perceive whether the ball is at its peak (e.g., has
zero velocity) or not, it is sufficient – from the model’s perspec-
tive – to make the ball pass through a specific height to reproduce
the respective effect. Indeed, when considering this, the model
is highly accurate. This was easy, however, because most actions
reproduce several effects. For example, all actions are suitable to
make the ball travel through the lowest position E1.
4A ball thrown with the strongest action A4 reached the peak of its trajectory after
0.5 s, about 1.2 m above the hand (gravity constant of 9.81 ms−2). The ball then
accelerated down again. The peak height of throws with other actions Ai was pro-
portional to the index i of the action: A1, A2, A3 produced heights of 0.3, 0.6, and
0.9 m, respectively.
The four effect nodes covered the range from the height reached by the weakest
throw A1 to the strongest throw A4 equidistantly. In each time step, the effect node
encoding the height closest to the ball position was active.
Optimal actions
When many actions are suitable to reach a goal, one might ask
which action should be selected. From a functional point of view,
it is reasonable to select the most efficient action (Todorov, 2004).
Because energetic costs and uncertainties are not included in
our model, the most efficient or optimal action can be consid-
ered the action that produces an effect as quickly as possible. In
our example, the optimal action is always the strongest throw
(A4), because this action propels the ball to all possible posi-
tions faster than any other action. However, when the model
associates an action to everything that happens later, subopti-
mal actions are chosen in 75% of cases (Figure 5B, right black
bar).
To improve efficiency, one could assume that actions are only
associated to those effects that occur within a short time win-
dow after action execution. Experimental results suggest that this
time window spans between 1 and 2 s (Elsner and Hommel,
2004). Figure 5B shows the percentage of successful and optimal
actions for different time windows, using a sample rate of 10 Hz.
For short time windows, successful actions are more frequently
optimal than for longer time windows. Nevertheless, the model
cannot always generate successful actions if the time window is
short. The reason for this is illustrated in Figures 5D–G. The
Figures show the strength of action-effect associations acquired
with time windows of different lengths. If the time window is
short (0.0–0.1 s, Figure 5D), the most effective action (A4) is asso-
ciated to E1, but because the ball needs more than 0.1 s to move
into the receptive field of nodes E2–E4, these effects never get
associated to any action. If the time window is longer, all effect
nodes get associated with action nodes. However, widening the
time window removes the bias to associate effects with those
actions that produce the effect quickly, yielding inefficient action
choices.
To assess whether this trade-off can be avoided by a more
sophisticated trace decay function, different decay functions were
compared. Figure 5C shows the usage of different decay functions,
which modulate the strength for temporally distant action-effect
associations. Whereas an exponential decay function yielded the
best result, a linear and an inverse proportional decay function
were just as inefficient as a constant function.
To conclude, we applied a variety of sample rates, time win-
dows in which actions and effects would be associated, and trace
decay functions in the learning tasks with dynamic effects. Except
for the shortest time windows, most goals could be reached
but action selection was rather suboptimal. If the time window
was short or an exponential decay function was applied, opti-
mal actions were selected more frequently. Although this poses
a functional limitation, it corresponds to human action-effect
learning (Elsner and Hommel, 2004). Thus, from a psycholog-
ical perspective, this property of the associative learning rule
supports the model of Ideomotor Theory. Therefore, Ideomo-
tor Theory is also supported as an account for action-effect
learning.
CASE 5: STIMULUS DEPENDENCY AND SEQUENTIAL ACTIONS
In the previous cases the activation of a single action node resulted
in some effects. However, many situations are more complex. Not
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FIGURE 5 | (A)The chart shows the effect of the different sampling rates
on learning if effects unfold dynamically in time. (B)The chart shows the
effect of time windows of different length on the acquisition of an effective
(white) and optimal (black) action-effect mapping. (C)The chart shows the
effect of different trace decay functions. The insets show the decay
functions between 0.0 and 1.0 s after action execution: const: constant
value in time window 0.0–1.0 s; exp, exponential decay; 1/x, inverse
proportional; linear, linear decrease. (D–G)The charts show the strengths
of action-effect associations after learning of 1000 episodes with a time
window of 0.1 s (D), 0.2 s (E), 0.3 s (F) and 1.0 s (G). Black squares denote
strong connections between actions and effects, white squares denote no
connections.
only do action-effects depend on the current state of the body or
the environment, but some effects may only be produced under
conditions that need to be approached beforehand. For example,
before a lifting movement of the arm causes the ball to fly, the
ball needs to be grasped. In humans, even simple actions such
as grasping a cup require the coordination of multiple move-
ments (Herbort and Butz, 2011). Moreover, a concerted pattern of
control signals needs to be sequenced to enable even simple arm
movements (Gottlieb, 1996).
Direct and indirect (state-) action-effect associations
To test whether Ideomotor Theory is capable of sequencing
actions, we altered our example in several ways. Consider for now
that there are four actions, A1–A4. Each action moves the arm to
a specific position. Action A1 moves the arm to a low position,
action A2 to a higher position, and so on. We assume that the
ball rests in the open hand. As long as the hand moves down or
up slowly, the ball stays in the hand. In these cases, actions A1 to
A4 result in effects E1 to E4, respectively. If the hand moves up
quickly, the ball is thrown. The peak position of the ball trajectory
depends on how far the hand has moved in the last step. If the
hand starts from the lowest position, which is encoded as E1, and
A3 is executed, the effect will be E5. If A4 is executed, E6 will result.
In this example, many effects can be reached by simply executing
a single action. However, in some cases several actions need to be
sequenced. For example, if the ball should be thrown as high as
possible (E6), one has to execute A1, to move the arm and ball
down, and then A4, to propel the ball quickly upward. Likewise, if
one has just generated E1 and now wants to produce E4, the arm
needs to be brought up slowly by executing A2, A3, and then A4 in
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succession. If action A4 would be directly executed, the ball would
be thrown in the air and E4 would not be reached5.
To be able to apply Ideomotor Theory to this example, it is
necessary to make action-effect associations conditional on the
current state. This conditionality is realized by adding a state layer.
Kiesel and Hoffmann (2004) have provided empirical support for
the state-conditionality of action-effect associations.
The state layer encodes the effect of the previous action and is
otherwise functionally and structurally similar to the effect layer.
State-action-effect associations are formed between active nodes
of the three layers during learning, dependent on the state before
the action, the action, and its effect. Unlike in the previous cases, a
learning episode is now defined as a sequence of actions that lasts
until the child produces a particular effect, which has been ran-
domly determined before the episode. For goal-directed actions,
the weights of those state-action-effect associations that match the
current state and the desired effect are compared, and the action
of the strongest state-action-effect association is executed.
When applying this model directly to the task, state-action-
effect associations similar to those in Figure 6A are formed. An
inspection of the chart reveals that several associations have been
formed. However, some combinations of states and goals are not
associated to any action nodes. For example, for goal E6 no action
is associated with the states 1, 2, and 3. This lack of associations
is due to the fact that some goals just cannot be reached directly
from some states, but only by sequencing several actions.
Hence, Ideomotor Theory needs to be extended in a way that
enables such sequencing. To allow this, a trace conditioning pro-
cedure similar to that of Case 4 can be used. If each state-action
pair is not only associated to its immediate, direct effects, but also,
due to its trace, to subsequent, indirect effects – just as is done
to enable learning in the previous case – a sufficient structure of
state-action-effect associations might be built. Figure 6B shows the
state-action-effect associations for a model in which the executed
states and actions were associated to all subsequent effects, using
5The following relationship between situations, actions, and effects were used. Let
n be the number of different actions, e(t − 1) the state before the execution of the
action a(t ), a(t ) the action, e(t ) the effect after the execution of action a(t ), and
t be a specific point in time. Action a(t ) was encoded by setting A(t )a(t)= 1 and
all other nodes to A(t )i= 0, i 6= a(t ). Likewise, state e(t ) was encoded by setting
E(t )e(t)= 1 and all other nodes to E(t )i= 0, i 6= e(t ).
To initialize an episode, time was set to t = 1, e(0) was either set to a random integer
between 1 and n (learning) or to a specific value in that range (testing). In the case
that e(t − 1)+ 1≥ a(t ), the effect was e(t )= a(t ), i.e., ball and arm were moved
together. Otherwise, the ball was thrown with e(t )= n− 1+ a(t )− e(t − 1) and
the episode ended.
During learning, actions a(t ) were randomly set to a value between 1 and
n. After each action, the state-action-effect weights m were updated, includ-
ing a trace of past states and actions. For each time step u that has
already passed in the episode (u= 1..t ), the following update rules were used:
me(u− 1), a(u), e(u)=me(u− 1), a(u), e(u)+ f (t − u). If there was no memory trace, f (x)
was set to 1.0 when x was 0.0, and otherwise to zero. If the exponential function was
used, f (x)= e−x . If a flat function was used, f (x)= 1.
During testing, actions were generated by the weights associated to the state, each
potential action j, and the desired effect e∗, a(t )j=me(t ),j,e∗. The action associated
to the highest weight was then executed. If several actions had maximum weights,
a random choice was made. An episode ended if the ball was thrown, if the desired
effect was produced, or if more than twice as many steps elapsed as would be nec-
essary to be able to reach either effect from either initial state. The evaluation was
conducted 100 times for each initial state and each desired effect.
an exponential trace decay function. For each state in which the
ball is still in the hand (1–4) and for each goal, at least one action
can be derived.
Trace decay
To test the importance of different ways to associate later effects
with state-action pairs, different decay functions were evaluated.
Figure 6C shows performance curves for different learning meth-
ods with respect to combinations of initial states and goals which
require sequencing actions (average of 100 simulations for each
condition). An exponential decay function yielded the best results
(blue circles)6. In contrast, learning is considerably slower if
no discounting function is used (green squares). If only direct
state-action-effect associations are formed, performance is heavily
impaired (red triangles) but still outperforms a baseline condition
without any learning in which random actions were chosen (light
blue triangles). The difference between the latter two conditions
arises because there is some chance that random actions result in
a state from which the goal can be directly reached in the direct
association condition, but not in the baseline condition.
This example shows that Ideomotor Theory is theoretically able
to account for action sequencing. However, the example of four
different actions is fairly simple. To evaluate whether learning is
still possible in a more complex scenario, we scaled the example up
to 12 possible actions (100 simulation runs). Figure 6D (left bar)
shows that the goal is reached in only about two of three cases,
even after 10.000 learning episodes. Further analysis reveals that if
a goal can be reached by a single action or very short sequences of
actions, the model produces almost optimal behavior. However, if
three or more actions need to be sequenced, behavior fails almost
all of the time (Figure 6E, black bars).
Action selection during learning
This leads to the question of why it is so hard to generate longer
action sequences. There are at least two potential reasons. First, it
is possible that the structure of our model lacks the power to store
the information that is necessary to sequence actions. Second, it is
possible that the model is not able to extract the information from
the training data. In the following, we argue that the latter aspect
limits the performance of the model. In our example, learning is
based on the random execution of actions. In the previous cases
this did not pose any problem, because each action was more or
less useful to generate some effects. This has changed in the cur-
rent task – while some action sequences are useful to produce an
effect, others are not. Moreover, the probability that a long, useful
action sequence is produced by chance drops exponentially toward
zero with growing sequence length. However, the model needs to
experience a long useful action sequence at least once to be able to
reproduce it.
Thus, one can now ask how critical performance depends on the
actions that are executed during learning. To test this, we imple-
mented three additional methods for action generation during
learning and trained the 12 action node model for 10.000 episodes,
using an exponential trace decay function (100 simulation runs for
6State-action-effects weights at time t after action execution were increased by e−0.2t.
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FIGURE 6 | (A)The chart shows the weights of state-action-effect
associations after 10,000 learning episodes when acquired without a trace of
past actions. Black squares denote large weights, white squares denote no
associations. (B)The chart shows the weights’ state-action-effect
associations after 10,000 learning episodes when acquired with a trace of
past actions. Please note, no actions are associated to states five and six
because these are states in which the ball has already been thrown. (C)The
chart shows how frequently goals are reached optimally (i.e., with a minimal
actions sequence) with different trace decay functions. (D)The chart shows
how efficient goals that require sequencing of at least two actions can be
reached dependent on the learning method in a setup with 12 action nodes.
(E)The chart shows how efficient goals can be reached, dependent on the
minimal number of actions that need to be sequenced to reach the goal and
dependent on the learning method.
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each condition)7. These methods only affect the action choices; the
learning mechanism for generating state-action-effect associations
remains identical in all cases.
The random exploration method, which was used so-far, pro-
duced a new random action in each time step. Thus the child
in the example just moves the arm to various positions, without
trying to throw the ball in a specific way. As shown above, only
mediocre results are achieved in this case, especially for longer
action sequences (Figures 6D,E).
With the goal-directed exploration method, actions are gen-
erated by trying to reach an internally (randomly) determined
goal (i.e., reach a specific height with the ball) based on already
acquired state-action-effect associations. As long as the model
does not know how to reach this ball-related goal it moves the
arm to random positions. As soon as the model moves into a
state that is associated with the goal, the action selection mode
changes. In 50% of the cases, it approaches the goal of throw-
ing the ball to a specific height directly, consequently facilitating
the generation of useful long action sequences. In the other 50%,
the arm is moved to a random position, as before, to be able to
explore alternative action sequences. The value of 50% yielded
the best performance in the current task in pilot simulations.
This method corresponds to a situation in which the child tries
to throw the ball to different heights completely on its own, and
without any previous knowledge of the task. Figures 6D,E show
that this action generation method is slightly superior to random
exploration.
The best effect method assumes that the child knows through
which sequence of states it has to travel in order to reach the goal.
This corresponds to a situation where the sequence of states may
have been shown to the child by a teacher. The teacher is able
to tell the child to which position to move the arm next, but of
course it cannot tell the child which action nodes to activate. In
50% of cases, the best effect method attempts to reach the next
state in the sequence by executing the best action currently known
for reaching that next state; otherwise, it activates a random action
node. Again, the value of 50% yielded maximal performance in
pilot simulations. This method can be considered to provide the
maximum information that could be realistically obtained. Even
though performance is high, it is unable to reach all goals. More-
over, actions are sequenced sub-optimally in more than 10% of
the cases (Figures 6D,E).
Finally, the best action method is of rather theoretic interest.
It randomly selects a goal and then produces the optimal action
sequence to reach it. This allows us to test if the model is able to
store longer action sequences, given that only optimal throwing
movements serve as learning examples. Figures 6D,E show that
this method results in perfect performances. This shows that the
model is structurally able to store state-action-effect associations
that enable perfect behavior. This implies that the model’s per-
formance is mostly limited by the necessarily suboptimal learning
experience.
In conclusion, it seems reasonable to assume that natural behav-
ior in learning a novel task is likely somewhat better than the
7State-action-effects weights at time t after action execution were increased by e−0.2t.
goal-directed exploration method, but not as good as the best
effect method. Thus, even a rather simple task with 12 different
actions can only be partially mastered by the learning algorithm
suggested by Ideomotor Theory.
Consolidation and planning
The previous section showed that the performance of our model
of Ideomotor Theory depends critically on what actions are expe-
rienced during learning. Even if all the individual elements of an
action sequence can be produced, they need to be executed in exact
sequence during learning to be able to reproduce certain goals.
Unfortunately, the probability that useful or even optimal action
sequences are tried out during learning decreases exponentially
with increasingly complex tasks.
While the basic state-action-effect triplets that constitute the
elements of longer action chains can be easily acquired, learning
entire sequences is difficult. This could be due to limitations in the
information acquired during learning or the ineffective use of this
information. To test the latter hypothesis, we tested whether repro-
cessing the acquired state-action-effect episodes could improve the
performance of the model.
Two different modes of such reprocessing can be distinguished.
First, the experiences of practice could be processed offline after
learning. Indeed, it has been shown that performance in novel
skills may increase after learning during times of rest (Brashers-
Krug et al., 1996; Korman et al., 2007). This process is usually called
consolidation.
Second, individual state-action-effect episodes may be
sequenced before trying to reach specific goals, a process that might
correspond to (motor) planning. In line with this reasoning is the
finding that planning more complex or longer movements takes
more time than planning simple movements (e.g., Rosenbaum
et al., 1984; Munro et al., 2007). Note that if a consolidation mech-
anism, a planning mechanism, or both are necessary for successful
learning this implies that associative learning alone is not sufficient
and that effect anticipations do not always trigger actions directly.
For the sake of the example, we assume that the child prac-
tices 1000 ball throws a day. The consolidation mechanism of the
model is invoked after daily practice and simulates another 1000
ball throws, based on the acquired state-action-effect links. This
allows the formation of novel indirect state-action-effect links by
learning from simulated action sequences that were not actually
experienced.
The planning mechanism is invoked before generating actions
in the test phase (but not for action generation in the acquisition
phase). The planning mechanism systematically chains experi-
enced state-action-effect links in order to reach remote goals.
It is implemented by spreading activation repeatedly from the
goal state or from states from which the goal can be reached to
other states, thus creating new associations between actions and
their indirect effects. This technique is known as dynamic pro-
gramming (Bellman, 1957). Of course, both mechanisms could be
realized in very different ways in the brain and we do not claim
that our approach necessarily reflects these mechanisms in detail.
The aim of the following simulations is to test whether consol-
idation or planning mechanisms can exploit the so-far learned
state-action-effect associations more efficiently.
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 494 | 11
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Herbort and Butz Computational perspective on ideomotor theory
To evaluate the impact of consolidation and planning, we sim-
ulated the 12 action nodes ball-throwing example with an overall
goal-directed training of 10.000 episodes. We used setups with
and without planning or consolidation (100 simulation runs for
each condition). Additionally, we simulated tasks with up to 96
nodes with and without consolidation and planning to see how
these mechanisms affect performance in more complex tasks (20
simulation runs for each condition). During testing, each goal was
pursued from each possible state 10 times.
Figure 7A shows that both planning and consolidation increase
the percentage of goals reached. Whereas consolidation improves
results only slightly, the planning mechanism yields a dramatic
increase in performance. The success rate of about 90% after
10.000 trials of the models without planning is already surpassed
after 200 trials if planning is employed. Whereas the overall
success rate is little affected by the consolidation mechanism,
Figure 7B shows that consolidation increases the percentage of
optimally sequenced actions. This improvement is visible for
models with and without planning. This suggests that planning
and consolidation may play complementary roles. Whereas plan-
ning enables sequencing novel actions from acquired state-action-
effect links, consolidation tends to improve the efficiency of these
links.
Finally, we compare the pure Ideomotor Theory model against
models that include consolidation and planning for up to 96 action
nodes. Figure 7C shows that planning and consolidation enables
the model to acquire much more complex tasks than would be
possible without these mechanisms. Figure 7D charts model per-
formance by the minimum length of action sequences required
to reach a goal after 10.000 learning episodes. It can be seen that
these additional mechanisms are pivotal to generate longer action
sequences.
In sum, the planning mechanism especially enables effective
sequencing of actions after comparatively little practice. Moreover,
such a planning mechanism also allows adjusting action sequenc-
ing to situational constraints (Butz et al., 2007). For example, many
throwing heights can be achieved from various initial positions of
the hand. If some positions cannot be reached in a specific sit-
uation due to external obstacles or reduced mobility of the arm,
for example, planning mechanisms might provide the flexibility to
take such constraints into account.
To conclude, it seems plausible from a psychological and func-
tional perspective that additional mechanisms play a crucial role
for the acquisition and execution of goal-directed behavior. This
implies that strong Ideomotor Theory and, in particular, that
the claim that effect anticipations shall directly trigger actions,
provides an insufficient account in more complex tasks.
DISCUSSION
In the previous section we developed a simple model of Ideomotor
Theory. Following the example of a child learning to toss a ball,
we extended our computational analysis beyond the learning chal-
lenges of common experiments on Ideomotor Theory. Given the
simplicity of Ideomotor Theory, the model did rather well in many
tasks. First, the model accounted for simple one-to-one mappings
as used in many experimental setups. However, learning took con-
siderably longer if many distinct actions and effects had to be
considered, if the system was noisy, and if irrelevant actions possi-
bilities shrouded the task-relevant actions. Nevertheless, the model
was able to reach various goals after extended practice. Second, the
model was capable of performing a task in which various actions
or action sequences reached identical goals. Controlling such tasks
is a non-trivial feature which cannot be accomplished by a range
of learning mechanisms. However, this ability is impaired to some
extent if action nodes have broad receptive fields. Third, the model
was able to account for learning in dynamic environments if the
delay between actions and their effects was small. A major chal-
lenge identified for Ideomotor Theory is the formation of links
between actions and delayed effects. Likewise, while Ideomotor
Theory can account for action sequencing in simpler tasks, the
successful production of longer action sequences requires a rather
lengthy acquisition phase. To conclude, our model suggests that
Ideomotor Theory provides a good account for efficient unsu-
pervised learning if (1) effects follow actions in close temporal
proximity, (2) actions are simple movements that do not require
intricate sequencing, and (3) the range of potentially relevant
actions and effects is restricted. If these conditions are not met,
implementations of Ideomotor Theory require extensive learning
to approach reasonable performance.
Functionally, these preconditions could be said to limit the
usefulness of Ideomotor Theory as a general mechanism for the
acquisition of goal-directed behavior. However, these functional
shortcomings support the model from a psychological perspec-
tive, because these limitations resemble those of humans in three
ways. First, it has been shown that action-effect associations are
only learned if both appear in a narrow time window (Elsner and
Hommel, 2004). Second, skills in the “zone of proximal devel-
opment,” which refers to capabilities that are just a little more
complex than those already possessed by a learner, can be read-
ily acquired (Vygotsky, 1978). In contrast, human beings have
difficulties in acquiring skills that go far beyond their current capa-
bilities. In our model, this effect was mimicked in Case 5, when
skill learning required sequencing actions. Whereas the model can
easily learn novel skills that require the sequencing a small num-
ber of familiar actions, it is far more difficult to learn skills which
require long action sequences. Third, action and stimulus dimen-
sions need to be constrained for humans to acquire novel skills.
This was also evident in our model. Learning benefited if a teacher
provided information on the to be executed task and if the num-
ber of potential actions and effects was constrained (Cases 2 and
5). This also parallels learning in humans. When children learn
new skills, parents, older children, or other persons often sup-
port learning (Rogoff, 1998) by, for example, guiding attention
(Zukow-Goldring and Arbib, 2007). However, in some cases skill
acquisition cannot be supported from the outside or is only sup-
ported to a limited degree. In these cases, skill acquisition requires
a lot of time. For example, infant reaching movements converge
toward an adult-like level only after about 2 years (Konczak and
Dichgans, 1997).
Thus, in sum, it can be argued that the identified functional
limitations of Ideomotor Theory resemble those of humans. To
nevertheless enable learning, humans try to constrain the space of
relevant actions and stimuli. If this cannot be achieved, this type
of human learning is a time-consuming process.
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FIGURE 7 | (A,B)The charts show the percentage of goals reached (A) or
reached in the most efficient way (B) after different numbers of learning
episodes. Four models were tested: pure Ideomotor Theory (IMT), an
extension of IMT with a consolidation mechanism, an extension of IMT with a
planning mechanism, and an extension of IMT with both kinds of
mechanisms. (C)The chart shows the percentage of successful and optimal
actions for learning tasks with different numbers of action nodes for the pure
IMT model or models with consolidation and planning. (D)The chart shows
the percentage of successful actions by the shortest action sequence length
required to reach a goal.
CHALLENGES FOR STRONG IDEOMOTOR THEORY
The various learning tasks could all be mastered to some extent.
However, in some cases extensive learning experience was nec-
essary to reach a high performance level. This suggests that the
representational structure proposed by Ideomotor Theory, which
was captured by our model, is adequate to control behavior. The
major challenge stems from the difficulty to gather enough and
good learning examples to fill the representational structure. While
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this was already evident from analyzing scenarios with an increas-
ing number of action nodes, this problem was most dramatically
exposed if a task required action sequencing. This reasoning is fur-
ther supported by the fact that the exploration strategy during the
acquisition phase had a very strong impact on performance. In the
unrealistic case that perfect action sequences served as input for
the ideomotor learning mechanism, the model learned to control
actions optimally. However, if action selection during learning was
less ideal, models of identical structure performed worse and were
partially unable to sequence longer actions. Thus, even in the sim-
ple ball-throwing task in which the arm of the child could assume
only 12 different postures, a random or goal-directed learning
scheme results in mediocre performance, even after throwing the
ball 10.000 times.
IMPLICATIONS
Our results have two implications that relate directly to Ideomotor
Theory. First, they shed light on the potential role of intentionality.
Second, they relate to the validity of the direct-activation claim.
Intentional actions
It has recently been debated if an intentional action mode is neces-
sary to enable action-effect learning. It has been argued that freely
chosen, intentional actions (but not reactions) on a stimulus are
associated to their effects (Herwig and Waszak, 2009). However,
action-effect learning in a forced choice acquisition phase has also
been reported (Pfister et al., 2011). While intentional and stimulus-
based actions may be functionally distinct (Waszak et al., 2005),
our model is mute to the differences between these two modes.
Nonetheless, our analysis hints at another facet of intentionality.
In our example of sequencing actions, we contrasted a random
and a goal-directed exploration method. The goal-directed explo-
ration method mimicked the behavior of a person who moved the
arm in order to reach the overarching goal of throwing the ball to
a specific height. Such an overarching goal was not present in the
random exploration method. Thus, the goal-directed exploration
method is intentional whereas the random exploration method is
unintentional. This suggests that, at least in tasks that require the
execution of more complex actions, intentionality might affect
the way actions are executed during early phases of learning.
Whereas an intentional mode produces actions that are fairly well
suited for ideomotor learning, purely random exploration is less
efficient. Indeed, it has been shown that participants learning a
novel sensorimotor task switch to successively more goal-directed
action modes after having explored basic action-effect relation-
ships (Sailer et al., 2005). However, it is questionable to what extent
this reasoning can be applied to experimental tasks that frequently
require minimal action coordination.
Planning
Strong Ideomotor Theory implies that effect representations
directly trigger actions. This claim is central to strong Ideomo-
tor Theory as it distinguishes it from many of its competitors
(Shin et al., 2010). Our model suggests a more differentiated
view on this topic. The analysis revealed that our model is able
to account for learning short action sequences. However, when
longer action sequences had to be generated, only a planning
mechanism enabled effective goal-directed behavior. Moreover,
computational models of motor planning have shown that such
mechanisms provide a flexibility that cannot be accomplished by
direct action-effect mappings (Kawato et al., 1990; Rosenbaum
et al., 1995; Cruse, 2003; Butz et al., 2007; Herbort et al., 2010).
Thus, our analysis suggests that the direct-activation claim may be
justified if the effects can be realized by executing simple actions.
However, if it is necessary to sequence longer chains of actions,
indirect planning mechanisms, which mediate between goals and
actions, seem to be employed.
COMPARISON OF IDEOMOTOR THEORY WITH MODELS OF MOTOR
LEARNING AND CONTROL
The previous section has shown that action-effect learning and
goal-directed behavior may not be as simple as predicated by
Ideomotor Theory. Our critique focused mainly on Ideomotor
Theory’s claim that effect anticipations directly trigger actions.
Setting this aside, the other claims of Ideomotor Theory seem
generally feasible from a computational perspective. To illustrate
this point, we want to discuss the relationship between Ideomotor
Theory and (computational) models of motor learning. We focus
on motor learning because motor learning can be considered to
be one of the computationally most complex learning problems
that human beings face. In the following we make two arguments.
First, we show that Ideomotor Theory is an effective way to address
learning without prior knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.
For this reason, we discuss other models only with respect to the
issue of learning a novel task (for reviews discussing such models
in more detail see: Todorov, 2004; Butz et al., 2007, 2008). Second,
we argue that the mechanisms suggested by Ideomotor Theory
need to be complemented with other approaches to account for
human behavior.
Bootstraping action-effect learning
Several recent computational models of motor learning and con-
trol share the assumption that goals are represented in terms of
sensory effects with Ideomotor Theory. Moreover, the acquisi-
tion of action-effect associations is central to these models (e.g.,
Kawato, 1999; Butz et al., 2007). However, note that the direction
of the associations is emphasized. In the motor literature, the term
“forward model” refers to a set of action-effect links. The term
“inverse model” is usually used to describe a set of associations
between effects and actions, which are the focus of the following
discussion.
The most basic learning scheme to associate effects with the
actions that cause them is direct inverse modeling (Kuperstein,
1988; Jordan and Wolpert, 1999). According to direct inverse mod-
eling, one-to-one effect-action associations are extracted from
random movements. Each time an action is executed and an
effect is observed, direct inverse modeling updates the corre-
sponding effect-action mapping. The updating is based on the
difference between the action that has actually been executed
and the action with which the acquired effect-action associations
would have tried to realize the actual effect. Thus, direct inverse
modeling seems closely related to ideomotor learning, as learn-
ing is possible without an external error signal. The key difference
is that direct inverse modeling updates action-effect associations
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with a supervised learning mechanisms, such as the delta rule,
whereas Ideomotor Theory suggests an updating according to an
unsupervised Hebbian-like rule.
While this difference seems rather technical, it has considerable
impact on the capabilities of the learning mechanisms. If multiple
actions result in identical effects, direct inverse modeling may fail
(Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992; Jordan and Wolpert, 1999). Fur-
thermore, as direct inverse modeling associates each effect with a
single action, it is impossible to associate an effect with potentially
multiple traces of various previous actions. Hence, this scheme
cannot be applied to tasks in which actions unfold in time. While
this limitation can be circumvented to some degree by reformulat-
ing the learning problem (Bullock et al., 1993), the mechanism is
considered to be rather ineffective (Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992;
Jordan and Wolpert, 1999) in dynamic settings with redundant
action possibilities.
More advanced learning mechanisms do not suffer from the
limitations of direct inverse modeling (e.g., distal supervised learn-
ing, Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992; feedback error learning, Kawato
and Gomi, 1992). However, such mechanisms require an external
error signal (for a discussion see Butz et al., 2007). This implies that
there is some additional knowledge source available that provides
information on how to improve one’s actions. Thus, these learn-
ing schemes may refine skills and improve performance but they
cannot bootstrap action-effect learning. Moreover, these super-
vised learning schemes usually encode the single optimal action
for each possible goal. This may be computationally efficient but
may be disastrous if optimality criteria change. For example, an
approximately straight movement path may be learned because
it can be considered optimal for simple point-to-point move-
ments (Flash and Hogan, 1985). However, straight movements
are useless if there are obstacles in the way. Since other previously
suboptimal actions are not encoded by the supervised learning
schemes, alternative action sequences cannot be generated. In con-
clusion, supervised learning mechanisms have two limitations.
First, action-effect learning in a novel situation is impossible.
Second, behavior cannot be quickly adapted to changing task
constraints.
Finally, Schmidt’s (1975) Schema Theory is a prominent frame-
work of motor skill learning. According to Schema Theory, motor
skills are organized around schemata that map goals onto suit-
able actions and the sensory input that usually accompanies their
execution. A key feature of these schemata is their ability to para-
meterize actions (e.g., the strength of a ball throw) with respect
to a goal (e.g., the target height of the ball) and initial condi-
tions. Thus, the Schema approach offers an account for how a
single skill can be applied to different tasks, such as throws of
different height. While this account is highly attractive, Schema
Theory has been formulated on a rather structural level. The pre-
cise learning mechanism that enables the abstraction of schemata
from individual experiences or the generation of new schemata
has not been formulated (Schmidt, 1975, 2003). Thus, Schema
Theory does not offer a learning mechanism itself but is built
on the assumption that such a mechanism exists. Whether learn-
ing mechanisms similar to those suggested by Ideomotor Theory
could offer an implementation for schema generation has yet to
be evaluated.
Thus, given the failure of direct inverse modeling for action-
effect learning in redundant or dynamic tasks, the failure to boot-
strap action-effect learning with supervised learning schemes, and
the general inflexibility of both approaches, one can ask whether
Ideomotor Theory can make a contribution. We think the answer
should be “yes.” Our analysis has shown that ideomotor learning
does not require an error signal or any prior information about
the relationship between actions and effects. Moreover, ideomotor
learning is able to cope with action redundancy, as has been shown
by the paper plane example. Finally, ideomotor learning can han-
dle situations in which actions and effects unfold in time. Thus,
it seems that ideomotor learning could be a candidate to explain
initial motor learning. Indeed, a simple computational model of
Ideomotor Theory can account for learning to control a simple
dynamic limb (Herbort et al., 2005). However, ideomotor learn-
ing can also lay the basis for more complex motor behavior. In
our SURE_REACH model, we applied the principles of ideomo-
tor learning to the control of a redundant arm (Butz et al., 2007;
Herbort and Butz, 2007; Herbort et al., 2010). As in our last exam-
ples, the SURE_REACH model also deviates from pure Ideomotor
Theory by including a planning mechanism. The model shows
that ideomotor learning and a planning mechanism enables to
explain highly adaptive behavior, such as the avoidance of obsta-
cles, the reduction of the motion of injured joints, the integration
of externally and internally defined constraints, and anticipatory
adjustments of movements to subsequent actions. Thus, it can
be concluded that the principles of ideomotor learning, as simple
as they might be, can result in surprisingly adaptive and efficient
behavior.
Complementary mechanisms
The previous section has shown that Ideomotor Theory, in con-
trast to many other theories, offers an effective unsupervised learn-
ing mechanism. In turn, future extensions of Ideomotor Theory
could benefit considerably by adopting aspects of current models
of motor learning and control.
Current models of motor learning and control distinguish
clearly between predicting the consequence of an action (with
forward models) and selecting an action to produce an effect
(inverse models, Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992; Kawato and Gomi,
1992). This distinction is also made in Adams’ (1971) closed loop
theory and Schmidt’s (1975) Schema Theory. The distinction is
based on the findings that forward models are acquired faster
than inverse models (Flanagan et al., 2003) and that both types
of models assume different functions (Desmurget and Grafton,
2000). For example, in contrast to inverse models, which are pri-
marily involved in control, forward models may help to cancel
out noise, improve action selection by establishing an internal
control loop, or even support inverse model learning (Karniel,
2002). In contrast to these considerations, Ideomotor Theorists
describe the link between actions and effects as “bidirectional”
(e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2004; Shin et al., 2010), thereby neglect-
ing potentially different mechanisms underlying mappings in
different directions.
Moreover, in many models it is assumed that basic informa-
tion is further refined during motor learning. One possible way
to refine a motor skill is to use the output of the ideomotor
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model as a teaching signal for a secondary controller that improves
performance and also mostly determines control signals (Kawato
et al., 1987). In addition, basic acquired action-effect associations
could be abstracted into schemata to form the basis of higher
order motor skills (Schmidt, 1975). In this view, Ideomotor The-
ory could describe early processes of skill acquisition. It is likely to
be complemented by other mechanisms later on.
Finally, the future extension of models of Ideomotor Theory
should elaborate on mechanisms to model state- or context-
dependent action-effect learning. In our Case 5 we introduced sim-
ple state-action-effect associations. However, it has been suggested
that action-effect associations are only stored context-dependently
if no contingent relationship between actions and effects can be
otherwise established (Hoffmann, 2003). To accommodate such
a process, it is likely that the representational structure of action
nodes, effect nodes, and context nodes has to be adapted during
learning. This, however, is out of the scope of our current model.
In conclusion, to model the acquisition of goal-directed behav-
ior, Ideomotor Theory should be embraced as a core element.
However, it needs to be integrated into larger frameworks to
account for the control of actions, the refinement of movement
skills, or abstraction processes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Ideomotor Theory is a framework that explains action-effect
learning without prior knowledge with an astonishingly simple
mechanism. Whereas the claim that actions are triggered by the
anticipation of desired effects has found considerable empirical
support, the assumptions that actions are directly associated to
their effects during learning and that effect anticipation directly
trigger actions have been examined rarely and indirectly. Here we
took a computational approach to evaluate whether these assump-
tions are theoretically suited to explain goal-directed action con-
trol and action-effect learning. We developed a simple computa-
tional model of Ideomotor Theory and subjected it to a number of
different learning tasks. In general, the model operated successfully
on a wide range of tasks. Similar to humans, the model had diffi-
culties if the range of potentially relevant sensory and action nodes
was very large. Also similar to humans, the model failed to associate
actions with delayed effects. However, when learning tasks require
sequencing motor commands, which is the case for even simple
reaching or grasping movements, Ideomotor Theory failed. This
limitation mainly arose due to the model’s restriction that effect
anticipations should directly trigger actions. When adding plan-
ning and possibly consolidation mechanisms and thus deviating
from Ideomotor Theory’s claim that effect anticipations directly
trigger actions, effective goal-directed behavior was achieved even
for tasks where a proper sequencing of motor commands needs to
be learned.
To conclude, from a computational point of view Ideomotor
Theory offers a surprisingly sound basis to understand the acqui-
sition of goal-directed behavior. However, the assumption that
effect anticipations directly trigger actions can only be upheld for
learning tasks that require the learning of a mapping from sen-
sory to motor space. If actions unfold in time, additional planning
mechanisms are inevitable.
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